Christian Terrorism in India, Uganda and Indonesia

We have heard quite a lot about Islamist Terrorism and there has been a pretty fair comment which has been floating about asking why other religions have not been similarly classified. Judaism is well represented with its Zionist angle, but the issue is confused because now we have a Jewish State and as I have frequently said, states cannot commit terrorism, they can sponsor it but they cannot commit it. Hindu terrorism is getting there, some of the activities of some of the groups such as Bajrang Dal and others are perilously getting close to where I would explicitly call them as terrorist organisations. Buddhist terrorism is already present in Sri Lanka although one can argue this is more Singhala (linguistic based ethno terrorism) terrorism rather than religion based terrorism.

Well, the main reason in the Christian matter, in my opinion, is because the number of terrorist campaigns being driven by ideology based upon Christianity is few and far between and secondly, they have not been as brutal or visible as the Islamist ones. That said Christian terrorism does exist. I have recently seen this paper which does a good job in covering the three main instances of Christian terrorism, namely in North East India, Northern Uganda and the island of Ambon in Indonesia.

In the Name of the Father? Christian Militantism in Tripura, Northern Uganda, and Ambon; Jeroen Adam; Bruno De Cordier; Kristof Titeca; Koen Vlassenroot, Conflict Research Group, Department of Third World Studies, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 30:963–983, 2007

Although armed groups and political violence referring to Islam have attracted increasing attention since the start of the global war against terror, one particular religion can hardly be described as the main source of inspiration of what is commonly referred to as “terrorist acts of
violence.” Faith-based violence occurs in different parts of the world and its perpetrators adhere to all major world faiths including Christianity. As such, this article treats three cases of non-state armed actors that explain their actions as being motivated by Christian beliefs and aimed at the creation of a new local society that is guided by religion: the National Liberation Front of Tripura, the Lord’s Resistance Army, and the Ambonese Christian militias. It
analyzes the way by which they instrumentalized religion against respective backgrounds of conflict rooted in social change, the erosion of traditional identities, imbalances of power, and widening communautarian faultlines.

Well, my first objection is why ask why call it militantism? Never heard of that word, but perhaps a better word would be terrorism. Each of these groups are non governmental, they are waging a low intensity war against a state, have secessionist or insurrectionist or at least a political objective and draw heavily on elements of Christian theology for their ideology. So call them as terrorists, stop faffing around. The authors draw 4 lessons from their study of these 3 campaigns and I quote their full conclusion as it is important to read their own words:

First, various forms of Christianity prove instrumental in filling the sociocultural vacuum left by the thorough social changes of local societies. They offer an alternative reading of the changing environment in the absence of structures that can offer prospects for development and security. In the case of Tripura, Christianity has become a true “exit-strategy,” as it is often associated with access to the “progress” that is associated with “the West.” In this sense, religion can give meaning to the context of deeper processes of socioeconomic crisis and marginalization and can therefore offer new tools to understand this context. In the three cases, the said processes of social change were caused by different factors, such as migration and land seizures (most obvious in Tripura, also Ambon), the loss of social-economic
status inherited from colonial times (the Acholi, the Ambonese Christians), and subsequent marginalization and exclusion to the advantage of dominant out-groups.

Even though the process of “christianization” and references to religion do not necessarily lead to religious radicalization, the different case-studies reveal that the potential for this radicalization is higher in situations where socioeconomic differences are also translated into
religious terms. In this context, social or economic shocks are often explained as being caused by other religious groups, which are considered as threats to the position of one’s own group. This explains why in Ambon and Tripura, Christian communities feel increasingly threatened by competing or numerically superior non-Christian groups.

Second, the cases also prove how Christianity also serves other strategic functions, apart from coping with processes of marginalization and change: it is a central mechanism in processes
of self-definition, informing both the in-group cohesion and the relationship with the “out-group.” Important in these processes are the use of collective symbols, rules, and rituals that in turn lead to a further polarization of the relation with the out-groups, that is, the Muslim population for the Ambonese Christian militias, the non-Acholi for the LRA, and the Bengali Hindus for the NLFT. The more the internal religious identity is being strenghtened, the more
the rift with the out-group deepens.

Third, in the cases discussed in this article, processes of religious radicalization have been hastened by so-called trigger events that have widened already existing communitarian rifts:
theAgartala riots in Tripura in 1979 and 1980; the failed “Acholi coup” and subsequent crackdown in Uganda in mid-1985; and the Christian–Muslim riots in Ambon and other Moluccan islands in 1999 and 2000. In all the case-studies, religion has become the main mobilization force, even though the content of the religious message differs. The same can be said about the impact of religious mobilization of local society. In the case of Ambon, processes of religious mobilization and violence have widened and almost physically institutionalised
religious-communitarian divisions, for example in the form of formerly mixed neighborhoods in Ambon city that are now either “purely” Christian or Muslim.

A similar situation exists in the town of Agartala in Tripura. However, in Tripura and Northern Uganda, Christian radicalism and unpopular methods such as forced conversions and kidnapping young recruits has also created internal splits in the in-group, for example between non-LRA Acholi and LRA members and between Christian and non-Christian tribals and NLFT members in Tripura.

And fourth, the question remains to what extent outside influence and manipulation have, ideologically as well as logistically, facilitated the rise of religious radicalism. If one talks of safe havens and arms supplies, then it is clear that the LRA could, at least temporarily,
benefit from facilities in and supply routes from southern Sudan; the same goes for the NLFT in Bangladesh and the neighboring state of Mizoram.

Ideologically, native Christian groups from Mizoram played a key role in the rise of Christianity among the tribals in Tripura. In Ambon, the arrival of the Islamist Lashkar Jihad group, the perceived Western support for Ambon’s Christians as references by some of them to their fight being “a crusade against Islamic terrorism”—and similar sloganeering by the Muslim side about “fighting stooges of the depraved and immoral West”—have strengthened
perceptions of a global civilizational frontline on the island. Because of the strong mobilizing capacity of religion, the increasing use of and reference to religious symbols and the integration of a local conflict as part of what is perceived to be a global struggle, the situation in Ambon is certainly more typical and instrumental for the new global context as it is since 2001 than that in Tripura and Northern Uganda.

What the authors did not consider and that’s a gaping hole, is the role played by external monies and funding (such as from evangelical bodies in the west) or from governmental support such as the reported links between the Pentagon and Evangelical groups. But all this is definitely fuelling the clash of civilisations, I am afraid. Another reason why I do not like proselytisation and religious evangelism aimed at conversions at all. It is such a bizarre concept anyway but that’s my personal opinion. What I hate about it is the propensity of such conversions (or even dawa in some bad examples!) to lead to violence, misunderstandings and overall bad atmosphere in this charged religious times.

All this to be taken with a grain of piquant salt!!!