Introduction
E.H. Carr, in his seminal book, What is History?[1] mentions the concept, that History is a process, a river kind of structure which has a direction with an increasing magnitude. This process is directional, has certain value judgements relating to a “good” or “bad” direction, and has a magnitude in terms of ever expanding nature. In this essay, we first explore Carr’s concept of history as progress, then we go deeper into the value judgement aspect. Next we consider briefly the history of warfare over the past 200 years and finally we link the concept of progress in history with the progress in warfare.
History as Progress
Carr mentions that the ancient Greeks, such as Herodotus and Lucretius did not have a view on history, which was rather indifferent to any particular sense of significance of the past or any interest in the future. Virgil was perhaps the exception, who referred to the return to a golden age. This reference to a golden age means that they are ascribing some value judgements to the past and the present, a concept to which we will return later on. Jewish and Christian writers and historians then described a goal oriented nature of history, thus denoting meaning and purpose to it. Moving onwards, Carr mentions Gibbon, who writes “the pleasing conclusion that every age of the world has increased, and still increases, the real wealth, the happiness, the knowledge, and perhaps the virtue, of the human race”. In the early and middle part of the last century, the idea, that History is a vast, ever increasingly glowing process, changed direction and moved into “negative” territory with strong depressing prognostications of the current state and expected future of the world. Francis Fukuyama[2] is one of the more famous proponents of the idea, that history (admittedly in a limited sense of political developments) has finally reached its nadir of development and the utopian regime of liberal democracies is the best one can achieve.
This concept of history reaching an end, as Fukuyama mentions, or the Marxist proposition that the classless society is the end of political development, is not supported by Carr. The content and objective of history can only be judged on the basis of the present, only when we experience it. Calling it the end or even the beginning is inappropriate and leaves out a vast swathe of future happenings. This is not to say, that history evolves, a point which Carr makes emphatically. He makes a distinction between progress and evolution, saying that evolution is biological and is much more long term in nature and has to be considered separate from progress.
History does resemble evolution in the way that it progresses in fits and starts, has dead ends, deviates into unexpected directions and sometimes even reverses its direction. Carr mentions his time, the middle of last century, as a time when human beings were passing through a turning point. His time was a time of war, killing, dislocation and weakening of various authorities. While saying that, he ends the chapter with, “A society which has lost belief in its capacity to progress in the future will quickly cease to concern itself with its progress in the past….. our view of history reflects our view of society”.
Dimensions of Progress
As history is supposed to have both direction as well as magnitude with value judgements involved, the question arises as to how we measure this direction and magnitude. We can measure this, based on almost every branch of knowledge, from physics to chemistry, anthropology, biology, economics, sociology, mathematics etc. As an example, Fermat’s last theorem was originally propounded in the late 17th century, but its solution has exercised the minds of mathematicians ever since. Only in the past 20-30 years have recent advances given us partial solutions to the problem. This example of Fermat’s Last Theorem gives a way to measure the direction and magnitude of mathematical history particularly, but can be extended to cover overall history. We have a situation where a problem was noted, a hole in the wall of human knowledge was identified, and there were three centuries of trial and error, in which miniscule sub-bricks were laid to bridge the gap. This illustrates the direction and magnitude of human activity, which when we look back to, shows the annals of this particular part of history.
Similar examples can be taken from other fields of study, for example we have a better understanding of the physical world with the discovery of more sub-atomic particles, we can gaze deeper into space, we know more about the cretaceous era and we know more about plate tectonics. All these examples are illustrations of how knowledge has accumulated, acquiring a direction to continuously expand beyond the boundaries of scientific knowledge, gaining ever increasing magnitude. It is also generally accepted that this direction and magnitude is “good” or beneficial to human civilisation. While disagreements may occur, such as “globalisation versus localisation” or “capitalism versus communism”, humans usually agree on the goodness of the end result of knowledge development and may disagree on the means to achieve them.
However, the above mentioned examples do not explain the special case of war. Out of all the branches of knowledge, perhaps the study and practice of war is the only field where, while there are growth, direction and magnitude aspects, the goal of knowledge in this area is considered to be “bad”. To understand the concept of progress within war, we need to explore the various facets of warfare as we understand it.
The Architecture of War
Adopting the Luttwak[3] framework (see figure) and adding the missing elements, will provide a good framework for discussing the process relating to war. It should be noted that this framework is limited, since it really does not consider peripheral factors such as the philosophy, psychological factors, manufacturing aspects etc. of war. Relying on The Encyclopaedia of Military History[4], we can track the progress on various levels
The Era of Napoleon 1800-1850
During this phase, weapons based on gunpowder, such as the bayoneted flintlock musket and smooth bore cannon, merged with suitable tactics and doctrine. Tactics evolved through the guidance of Napoleon, who applied the concept of manoeuvre with frontal and flank attacks at the same time, backed by massed artillery attacks supporting the attacking divisions and protection for exposed flanks being provided by mobile cavalry. Light infantry again gained importance with more flexible tactics, given a far more autonomous basis of operations, especially when deployed in the French infantry column structure.
The British conceived their own reply to this, in the form of two person deep ambushes, using special muskets. Military organisation improved with the creation of the division as a formation containing infantry, cavalry and artillery capable of carrying out independent operations, backed up with a good logistics train. Moving up the framework, progress happened on the theater and grand strategy level with some of the major military thinkers emerging such as Napoleon, Jomini, Clausewitz, Mahan and others.
The Emergence of the Professional 1850-1900
Moltke, Grant, Lee, Mahan and Schlieffen were the premier military minds, who pushed for the creation of professional armies with general staffs. There were rapid developments in steam power engines, rail-roads, the telegraph, breech loading artillery and better shot casting methods. All this meant that the previous strategy of full frontal assault was ruled out, and dispersal and consequent manoeuvring took place as tactical strategies. Trench warfare emerged as a way to fortify positions and cavalry disappeared, as the propensity and capability to do physical damage increased. Naval warfare changed with the introduction of armour plate, torpedoes, mines and changes in naval fleet engagements.
World War I 1900-1925
A step change in the grand strategy level occurred, from the concept of ‘a nation in arms’ to ‘a nation at war’ or total war. For the first time, political and economic considerations were at a higher level than purely military aspects. Tactical strategy was much obviated by the rapid advance in weapons technology such as the machine gun, tank, poison gas, motorised transport, and even psychological operations such as institutionalised propaganda. Clemenceau, Foch, Joffre, Pershing, Haig, Allenby, Hindenburg, Ludendorff, Falkenhayn, Nicholas, Bruislov, Trotsky, Attaturk, Oyama, Togo, Pilsudski were noted as strategic military thinkers, and the increase in good thinkers from various countries is an example of how the entire world got caught up in war. Another development was the rise in disarmament and arms control frameworks with many peace and disarmament conferences being held as institutionalised international events with a peace counterpoint.
World War II 1925-1945
Military technology accelerated dramatically and this period ended with the rise of the nuclear age. Missile technology improved in the form of bazookas and rocket propelled grenades, to full fledged ballistic missiles such as the V-1 and V2 rockets. Artillery improved as well, the concept of tank destroyers and tank squadrons was seen with one of the world’s largest tank battles fought on the steppes of Russia. Electronics came into their own with radar, asdic and radio communications significantly changing communications, enemy identification and other tactical problems. Various segments of the armed forces such as land, sea and air operations came ever closer together in integrated formations. The political and economic framework of the nation was even more closely linked in the concept of total war and nation at war. For the first time, the theater aspect of the Luttwak framework was seen clearly such as the Mediterranean, the North African, the Pacific theater, etc... Dupuy mentions the pooling effects of the allied armed forces and how it was integrated to a considerably larger degree than previously implemented. This also had a rather significant impact on the logistics train with sea logistic trains, floating repair platforms, underwater fuel pipelines etc. coming to the fore.
Another significant change happened when the politicians and civil leaders took control over the strategic military operations of the war. Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, Chaing Kai-Shek and Hitler were some of the great civilian leaders of the time. Military leaders such as MacArthur, Eisenhower, Montgomery, Bradley, Wavell, Manstein, Tojo, Yamamoto, Model, Rundstedt, Kesselring, Patton, Rommel, Zhukov, Nimitz, Arnold etc stood out as brilliant military commanders, despite the fact that some did face defeat. Strategic objectives grew bigger in scope; wars were aimed at capture of strategic material and viewed on a grand global if not on a continental scale. Airpower was shown to have an equal if not greater impact than the land and sea arms. Siege warfare was finally put to rest.
Strategic plans assumed greater ramifications; mistakes could have severe implications and two examples of strategic surprise, Pearl Harbour and Singapore spring to mind. Tactical nature of warfare changed with armoured column manoeuvres and breakthrough tactics. Fast moving re-supply columns following on the armoured breakthrough helped to create a sustained effort. Amphibious warfare improved with specialised vehicles and ships like the LST and LSI. On the sea front, carrier battle groups came to typify the concept of projecting power while, battleships soon went to the dustbin of military history. Submarines, which were heavily used in WWI, were further extended in WW2 with corresponding developments in anti-submarine warfare. Strategic bombardment took off with commensurate impact on civilian populations and close air support doctrine was implemented in several ways, with command assigned to the ground forces or independently. Paratroops were created as a separate and discreet way of leapfrogging enemy positions and capturing strategic positions. Peacekeeping and disarmament initiatives saw the rise of the League of Nations as the first worldwide institution.
The Nuclear Superpower Age 1945 - 1990
Political and military strategy was driven by the confrontation between superpowers and given its own terminology, ‘the Cold War’. Space opened up as the fourth dimension, weapon systems and military satellites proliferated along with manned space flight. Electronic communications rapidly developed, thereby shortening the command and control framework, reducing time to transmit ideas and react to events. Colonialism withdrew with its attendant military problems and unrest in vast swathes of the world. International organisations steadily strengthened and expanded their role into humanitarian and development roles. Arms control and disarmament initiatives were launched and accepted as treaties.
Nuclear weapons changed the concept of warfare. For the first time, a weapon became a strategy in itself and became the instrument of the potential total destruction of the human race. This also had an impact on how limited wars are fought, the concept of deterrence was born and peripheral wars were the outlet to superpower confrontation. Military alliances became entrenched in the form of the Warsaw Pact and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
Truman, Churchill, Eisenhower, de Gaulle, Kennedy, Kurushev, Mao, Nehru, Tito, Nasser, Ho and others were recognised as statesmen, leading military geniuses such as MacArthur, Ridgeway, and Giap. Missile technology significantly improved as did chemical and biological warfare weapons and doctrine. Helicopters were used for a multiplicity of roles, such as air cavalry, but showed vulnerability to small arms fire. Special Forces were implemented as an elite force for special missions. The perennial battle between armoured tanks and anti tank weapons continued and developed on both sides. Nuclear energy changed the equation in the sea sector. Submarines, capital ships and carriers became nuclear powered and even more powerful with better missiles, communications, targeting systems, and planes.
The Post Cold War period 1990 onwards
With the collapse of the USSR, the world moved into a unipolar arena. Initially, the peace dividend meant that armed forces were cut back significantly; peace was breaking out all over the world. Thatcher and Reagan strode the world with their win over the USSR. Gorbachev became famous for his transformation of the world, Yeltsin implemented the fundamentals of democracy and capitalism in Russia, and nuclear weapons and missiles stockpiles were reduced. On the other hand, more countries became nuclear powers, while some countries gave up on their nuclear weapon programmes. For the greater part of the period, comparative peace reigned, with the exception of minor wars around the world. The United Nations became more involved in peace enforcement and peace keeping duties, which gave rise to many changes in tactics. Military operations became inextricably linked to humanitarian assistance, in-discriminate use of military power was constrained. The Gulf War showed the value of air power combined with a revolutionary increase in electronic measures.
For the first time, non-state actors became targets for state militaries, as racial and nationalistic conflicts broke out in the Middle East, Africa and Asia. Religious based fundamentalism started rising. The end of the century saw a serious upsurge in terrorism around the globe, this gave rise to asymmetric warfare that negated most of the technological superiority that the USA and the other western powers had. Airpower was used in Kosovo, Afghanistan and currently in Iraq with devastating effect, but tactics were rapidly changed with the realisation that ground troops will still be required in certain cases.
There was further development in military equipment technology with better protection in armour and missile equipment. Electronic development gave a huge boost to all military equipment within the land, sea, air and space sectors. Man got further divorced from the actual battlefield with remotely piloted vehicles on the ground, air and sea. Military planners realised that human intelligence is also as important as electronic intelligence. Electronic Intelligence, since the 1970’s, was considered to be the end all and be all of intelligence. The previous distinction between war and terrorism has blurred.
We have been discussing the physical and particular war methodology and its developments over the past 200 odd years. What we have not explored are two aspects, first is how to measure progress from a quantitative point of view and second is to try to explain why progress would occur in such a “bad” human endeavour.
How to measure progress in war?
We use some common factors to measure how war has progressed in the past 200 years. First by physical measures such as range, weight, vehicle armour plating, personal safety, increase in enemy identification, range and accuracy of projectiles and reduction in error rates, which are all indications that progress has happened. With the increase in communications technology, better surveillance, better planning techniques and computer power, armies are now better at achieving objectives as compared to 200 years past, when it was much more hit and miss. The effectiveness of the armed forces should also be compared with regard to the efficiency levels achieved during the attainment of these objectives.
While it is true that there has been a steady increase in the number of civilians killed in armed conflicts in the post war period, war has become more efficient, with relatively small numbers of uniformed casualties taken for attainment of objectives. In recent wars, with improved accuracy of munitions and careful target planning and acquisition, the relative number of civilian and military casualties has fallen. The ability to project power has increased as well. Previously power projection was limited many times by geography, but now geography is not the limiting factor, due to the presence of carrier battle groups or amphibious vehicles. As we saw, based on relatively clear measures and based on the history, progress has happened. The question now is why?
Potential Reasons for Progress in War
Waltz[5] proposes a structure for understanding the causes of war. According to Waltz, war is caused by the nature of man, the nature and structure of the state and the international system / structure of different states. There are other models and causal explanations ranging from Huntington’s clash of civilisation theory[6] to Wallerstein’s world system’s concept[7]. The reasons for war may be multifarious, seen from a secular or a religious perspective (for example, see Fr. Juan Carlos Iscara treatise[8] or the Quran[9]), but it is pretty well accepted, that war as a human activity was always there and is here to stay.
The main concern as one understands the essay question is, since Carr defined progress as something which is noble, good and praiseworthy, why would one see war (which is considered to be bad, pandering to baser instincts and condemnable) as showing signs of progress? This is where Carr’s viewpoint diverges from the others. Thinking of war as “bad” is a value judgement. On the other hand, we have already explained that war is considered to be a natural human activity. The fact that it is “bad” does not vitiate against human ingenuity or human knowledge development. For example, biological research has given rise to very needed medical knowledge, which extends human life, but at the same time allowed the misuse in form of biological weapons. As such, scientific and human knowledge is value-neutral. A plant to make pharmaceuticals can be used to make biological weapons as well. Both can be defined as progress, a “good” progressive step and a “bad” progressive step. As one would recall, Carr did mention that progress / history is not unidirectional, it stops, stutters, changes direction and magnitude just like the river image on the first page. For example, while nuclear weapons are capable of destroying the entire world, man is smart enough to know that this would lead to his own extinction and has hedged the use of nuclear weapons in, with arms control, disarmament, morals, command and control systems to name a few.
A further aspect which has not been considered is the professional aspect of the military. As Huntington[10] explains, over the past 200 years, the western military has moved from an aristocrat or mercenaries lead force, to a professional military officer corps. This meant that the selection and promotion of officers was done on the basis of their knowledge and skills. If an officer aimed at promotion (as one would expect), the officer had to show abilities in comparison with his fellow officers and hence had to analyse, develop, design and implement processes, techniques, tactics and strategy, which rendered the military more effective and efficient than previously known. Given this competition and the natural characteristic of professionals, to continuously increase their knowledge and skills, progress in war has steadily increased.
Man has been steadily evolving his knowledge across all human activities and most importantly, has the capacity to learn. This learning is what distinguishes humankind from other life-forms. We are able to learn by communication and build up on our knowledge base. Unlike other species, who mostly adapt to changing circumstances through evolution, mankind adapts by learning, by experimentation, by lateral thinking and theorising.
Given that war as a human activity has such huge implications in terms of casualties and emotions; it is inconceivable that human beings will not increase their knowledge of war. People learn from previous mistakes and mistakes in war, due to their very high cost, have an added impetus in trying to find ways to avoid repeating them. In addition, it has to be noted that most of the technical progress, like better casting and optimisation techniques, or more aerodynamic or stealthy materials are usually constructed in laboratories, far away from the trenches. The value chain is usually so long and with dual civilian military use, that the incremental impact of new developments is small and not startling. Our human civilisation places a high value on knowledge development. When this is linked up with questions of individual safety, the country’s political infrastructure, international relations or civilisation factors, progress in warfare is not only surprising but to be expected.
[1] Carr, E. H, 1961, What is History?, Palgrave, Hampshire
[2] Fukuyama, Francis, 1992, The End of History and the Last Man, Penguin Books, London
[3] Luttwak, Edward N., 1989, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, Harvard University Press, Harvard, 2nd Edition.
[4] Dupuy RE and Dupuy TN, 1977, The Encyclopaedia of Military History, Macdonald and Company (Publishers) Limited, London
[5] Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959),
[6] Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Making of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).
[7] Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York: Academic Press, 1974).
[8] http://www.sspx.ca/Angelus/2002_July/Just_War.htm, snapshot taken on 30 March, 2003.
[9] http://www.hti.umich.edu/cgi/k/koran/koran-idx?type=DIV0&byte=1320, sura 2:190, 193, 216, 22:39 snapshot taken on 30 March, 2003
[10] Huntington, S.P, 1957, The Soldier and State, The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
