An interesting review of a book review on one of the general’s books who commanded the Pakistani Army in 1971. Defeat has no fathers, it is an orphan and looking at the spate of books by the generals in charge then, looks like nobody was in charge, everybody was responsible and nobody was personally liable. One very interesting comment came back and this is what I have seen (as a very broad based generalisation), most of the third world country armies get more medals for killing their own people than the enemy. Pakistan’s army is no exception. In fact, for all the pious mumbling about Islamic armies, I would say that this Islamic Army of Pakistan has killed more Muslims than non-muslims. Post Independence, whether you think about Jordan, Kashmir, Kargil, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Baluchistan, Sindh, you name it…A.H Amin's Comments on Ahmad Faruqis Book Review of A.A.K Niazis Book on East Pakistan-2000
While you can spend quite a lot of time reading both documents, this is what puzzles me ever since. Is it indeed possible to fool all people all the time? What explains the fascinating behaviour of the Pakistani Army? that it manages to screw up almost everything it touches but is still allowed to grab the resources of the Pakistani state and even rule it. We are getting to grips with the betrayal of East Pakistan but what about the betrayal of West Pakistan? When will that final chapter be written?
That said, tactically and militarily, the Pakistani Army seems to be getting better, Kargil was a great example, Swat and the South Waziristan campaigns are also good. What happens to these generals when they grow up? Also, the current C-in-C Kayani seems to be a canny smart chappie. But here’s the question, the lessons of the 1971 war (see the Hamdoor ur Rahman Report summary here) doesnt seem to be learnt. The same old same old, the involvement with politics and massive corruption is still there.
Lots to think about.