Monday, November 19

'Wahhabism' in India - a fascinating overview paper!

Comments: I would have been interested to read about what the Iranian Shia's had to say about this AH group. Also, I would have been interested to read about where does the links to Saudi funding take AH? As we have seen, the increase in the Saudi Monarchical Wahhabism funding is steadily increasing the supply of jihadi's to Iraq and other places. Would this also happen in India? I am also disappointed at the lack of references and bibliography, but there you go!

Also see my series on muslim reformers on my weekly blog, one example about Syed Ahmed Khan is here.

Read and Ponder (sorry, no url, this paper was distributed by Yoginder via email)

By Yoginder Sikand

The term 'Wahhabi' is a deeply contested and much debated one. It is derived from the name of the eighteenth century Najdi Hanbali Muhammd ibn Abdul Wahhab, although, interestingly enough, Abdul Wahhab was not his name but that of his father. That itself clearly indicates that the term is rather loosely used and is often employed to refer to different, sometimes
mutually contradictory phenomena. It is instructive to note here that the term is not used by any Muslim group to define itself. Rather, it is used in a derogatory sense by critics of some Muslim groups that uphold a different, indeed opposed, understanding of Islam from theirs. Incidentally, not all these forms of Islam are associated with the particular vision of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab.

In the Indian context, broadly speaking, the term 'Wahhabi' is loosely used by a group of Muslims known as the Barelvis and other defendants of the cults of the shrines of the Sufi saints, to refer to two other groups who also claim to be Sunnis: the Deobandis and the Ahl-e Hadith (henceforth AH). Many Deobandis also refer to the AH as Wahhabis. It is thus important to clarify how both the Barelvis and the Deobandis respectively use the term and what they mean by it.

The Barelvis are a group among the Indian Sunnis who are defined by their association with the thought and teachings of the nineteenth century Ahmad Reza Khan of Bareilly, a town in north India. He upheld a certain reformed sort of Sufism while at the same time also defending many practices associated with the shrines of the Sufis, many of which were critiqued by other Muslim groups as biddat ('innovation') and shirk (polytheism), and also as being of Hindu or Shia origin. He also defended certain poplar practices such as the observation of the birth and death anniversaries of the Prophet and the Sufi saints, the belief in the intercessionary powers of the Prophet and the buried Sufi saints, and the belief that the Prophet was present in all places and that he had knowledge of the Unseen.

Along with the Barelvis, or followers of Ahmad Reza Khan, are many other Indian Sunni Muslims who also adhere to similar practices and beliefs although not identifying themselves as Barelvis. For both of these groups, who, together might account for a majority of the Indian Sunni Muslim population, the Sunni critics of their practices and beliefs are very loosely and erroneously branded as 'Wahhabis', be they Deobandis, AH or those who subscribe to the ideology of the Jamaat-e Islami, despite the fact that these three groups have serious differences with each other on theological grounds.

For many Indian Deobandis, it is the AH who are 'Wahhabis', owing to the latter's opposition to even reformed sort of Sufism in line with the shariah that the Deobandis uphold and to the tradition of taqlid or 'imitation' of one of the four major schools of Sunni jurisprudence (in the case of the Deobandis it is the Hanafi school).


What unites the Barelvi, popular Sufi and Deobandi definitions of the term 'Wahhabi' is the 'Wahhabi's' total opposition to anything that is seen as 'innovation', including Sufism and taqlid, coupled with a sternly literalist approach to the corpus of Sunni Hadith or traditions attributed to the Prophet. Due to paucity of time and space, this paper focuses mainly on the AH, who may be taken as representing a form of Islam that closely corresponds, on many counts, with what is popularly perceived of as 'Wahhabism'.

The term 'Ahl-e Hadith' literally means 'people of the Hadith', signifying the claim of this group to be the sole Muslim group that strictly abides by the Prophet's Sunnah or practice, as reflected in the Hadith tradition. AH writings often invoke what is said to be a Prophetic tradition that the Muslims would be divided into 73 sects, of which 72 would go to hell, and only one, the 'saved sect' ( firqa al-najiyya) would be saved. They claim to be that one sect, implying therefore, that all the other Muslim sects, whether Shia or Sunni, have gone astray from the Prophet's path and hence would merit Divine punishment. In addition to the term Ahl-e Hadith, they refer to themselves, as do the Saudi 'Wahhabis', as Salafis, or those who follow the Salaf-e Saleh or the 'pious predecessors' and as Muwahhidun or 'monotheists', implying, therefore, that the other Muslim groups are not among these.

Key Beliefs of the Ahl-e Hadith

In contrast to many Sufis, the AH's understanding of monotheism borders on anthropomorphism, being based on a strictly literalist reading of the Quran, reflecting the group's fierce opposition to tawil or allegorical interpretation. It regards the Sufi belief in the
intercessionary powers of the Prophet and the Sufi saints (wasilah, zariya) as akin to polytheism, arguing that these figures were mere mortals who are no longer alive. In contrast, Sufis believe that the Prophets and the saints are still alive, although not physically present in the world, and that they can be approached to communicate God on one's behalf.

A related point is the stern opposition of the AH to the popular customs associated with the shrines of the Sufi saints, which number in their thousands in India, and which attract people from different religious backgrounds, and not just Muslims alone. These practices are regarded as promoting polytheism. The AH insists that the buried saints are not alive and cannot hear one's requests, and that, hence, the cults and practices associated with their shrines are meaningless. Furthermore, it argues that the practice of building tombs is itself un-Islamic, and although because they are a small minority in India they cannot demolish the tombs of the Sufis, as the Saudi 'Wahhabis' have done, there is no doubt that this is something that they would fully support.

The rich tradition of Sufism in India, as many scholars have noted, was responsible, in large
measure, for the peaceful spread of Islam in the region. The Sufis spoke of God's love for all His creatures, insisting that the shariah could not be separated from the tariqa or mystical path. Their love and concern for the poor and downtrodden attracted many Hindus to accept Islam. Many of these were from the 'low' castes, who were crushed under the tyranny of the so-called 'high' caste Hindus. In order to make their message more easily understandable to the masses among whom they worked and preached, they adopted many local practices, motifs and idioms, and even spoke and wrote in the local languages, in contrast to both the court ulema, who wrote and spoke in Arabic and Persian, and to the Hindu Brahmins, who disdained the local dialects in favour of Sanskrit. Some Sufis were among the pioneers of literature in various local Indian languages. Their shrines attracted, as they continue to do today, large numbers of non-Muslims, too, who considered them as attained souls and close to God.

This rich pluralist popular Indian Sufi tradition is dismissed by the AH as largely 'un-Islamic'. Much of it is considered to be what it calls biddat or 'innovation', branded as borrowings from the Hindus, or, as in the case of mourning rituals for Imam Hussain during the month of Muharram, from the Shias, whom it considers as heretics. It disregards the claim, made by defendants of the cults of the Sufis, that many, though not all, of these practices can be regarded as 'praiseworthy innovations' ( biddat-e hasana), and argues that the shariah does not recognize such a category. Admittedly, some of these practices are indeed exploitative (such, as, for instance, donating money to shrines which is often used by a class of professional shrine-keepers as a source of livelihood), and some of the associated beliefs may be regarded as superstitious and indeed un-Islamic, a point that numerous Sufis will themselves make. But to consider every local customary practice as a biddat which will lead to hell, as the AH does, is itself said to be un-Islamic by those who defend some of these practices.

In line with its opposition to what it sees as biddat, the AH advocates a very sternly literalist approach to what it sees as its opposite, the Sunnah. In the process, it advocates numerous Arab cultural norms and practices to replace their local equivalents, thus tending to equate Arab culture with Islamic culture, and, in this process, undermining, as critics see it, the universality of Islam which transcends local cultural forms. This reflects the AH's opposition to ijma or analogical reasoning, which enabled Islamic jurisprudence to accommodate many local practices and institutions in the form of what were termed as urf or adat.

In other respects, too, the AH is distinct from many other Muslim groups, both Sunni and Shia. As mentioned earlier, it opposes the practice of taqlid, and even goes to the extent of arguing that this, too, is a form of idolatry and polytheism. This explains why the AH's critics also refer to the group as ghair muqallid (literally, 'those who deny taqlid). Furthermore, as noted above, its sternly literalist understanding of Hadith differs is significant respect from that of the
muqallids, whom it accuses of preferring the views of the Imams of their own respective schools of fiqh over confirmed Hadith reports, a charge that the muqallids deny. In response, muqallid critics of the AH, in India manily Hanafi Sunnis, argue that AH lack proper knowledge of the 'principles of Hadith' ( usul al-hadith), the 'principles of fiqh' (usul al-fiqh) and the skills of distinguishing what are considered to be 'abrogated' (mansukh) Hadith reports. They also accuse them of being selective in their use of what are considered genuine ( sahih) Hadith reports. Interestingly, the same allegations are leveled by the AH against their Hanafi detractors.

A marked aspect of AH propaganda, as is clearly evident from their literature, is their stress on external (zahiri) markers of identity, which they use both to critique the claims of other Muslim groups as well as to stress their own claims to being the sole 'saved sect'. This leaves them open to the accusation of being hardened 'externalists', zahir parsat (literally, 'worshippers of external [rules]') and of mistaking the letter for the spirit of the shariah. These external attributes also serve the crucial function of creating a separate AH community identity, which is further reinforced by the fact that the AH, like all other Sunni and Shia sects in India, have their own separate mosques and madrasas. AH literature is replete with intricate arguments about detailed aspects of Islamic ritual, on which they differ from the other Muslim sects, marshalling and selectively using or interpreting Hadith traditions to back their claim that their particular way of performing these rituals is the only correct way, or the way of the Prophet, implying, thereby, that the practice of the other Muslim sects is wrong, and that, therefore, their prayers and worship and not fully in accordance with God's Will.


Thus, for instance, they make much of their claim that their practice of placing their hands across the chest, rather than around the stomach, as the Hanafis do, reciting the word ameen aloud, rather than silently, and so on, are precisely what the Prophet used to do. They then use this to claim that they alone recite the namaz in the right fashion, employing this to bolster their sense of separate identity and to argue that they alone are the only group to follow the Prophet's practice. Their denunciation of other Muslim groups, both Sunni and Shia, is often much more vitriolic, and sometimes these groups are explicitly accused of being apostates, heretics and even 'enemies of Islam'. In turn, many of these groups level the same sort of accusations against the AH, some going to the extent of branmding the AH, and the Saudi 'Wahhabis' in general, as creations of the British and as stooges for the decadent Saudi monarchy and for American imperialism. AH propaganda and the counter-responses that it has invited have thus emerged as a major challenge to intra-Muslim unity, dialogue and ecumenism in India.

The Origins and Development of Indian 'Wahhabism'

The AH claims that they represent the tradition of the companions of the Prophet and to have been present in India since India's earliest contact with Islam, and that, therefore, they are not a new sect. However, their Muslim critics deny their claims of Islamic 'authenticity'. As a broader movement, as opposed to individual scholars who championed views similar to those of today's AH, the roots of Indian 'Wahhabism' go back to the Islamic reformism championed by the late eighteenth century Shah Waliullah of Delhi, who most other Indian Sunni groups, including the Barelvis and Deobandis, also consider as a major source of inspiration. It was Shah Waliullah's grandson, Shah Ismail, who actually departed from his grandfather's tradition to most forcefully champion numerous views that represented a radical break from popular Indian Hanafi Muslim tradition and which today's AH champions, most particularly in his denunciation of the cults of the Sufi saints and their shrines. His major book Taqwiat ul-Iman reads like an Urdu version of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab's Kitab ul-Tauhid, and the question of whether he was directly or indirectly influenced by the latter is still hotly debated by historians.

Shah Ismail gathered a large band of disciples and then headed for the Pushtun areas in what is today Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province, where he established what he described as an Islamic state, claiming to be amir ul-mumineen or the 'leader of the faithful'. However, he failed to gain much local popularity, probably because he was an outsider and because he sought to forcibly impose the shariah and extirpate popular Pushtun customary practices. He and his army led what they styled as a jihad against the Sikhs, who, at that time, where ruling the Punjab, and under whose rule Muslims were subjected to considerable oppression. In 1831, Shah Ismail and his men were routed by the Sikhs at Balakot and the short-lived 'Mujahdeen' state was crushed.

Following this defeat, the followers of Shah Ismail who remained traveled to various parts of India to spread their master's teachings. They seem to have played a key role in the uprising of 1857 against the British, or what is considered to be India's first battle for independence. Following the failure of the uprising, some of Shah Ismail's followers kept up the struggle against the British, leading uprisings in the Pushtun borderlands, which were, by the 1870s, brutally put down by the colonial authorities.

It would be wrong to see these so-called Wahhabi-led uprisings as simply a religious phenomenon, as the British then saw them and as the AH today also describe them. They were also anti-colonial and anti-imperialist movements. There was also a crucial class element involved in the spread of so-called Wahhabi ideas, which then took the form of local movements of resistance. For instance, in Bengal, the movements led by Tutu Mir and Haji Shariatullah, who, like the followers of Shah Ismail, spoke out against a range of customary practices among the Bengali Muslims, which they denounced as un-Islamic. These two popular preachers were also denounced by their critics as 'Wahhabis', although it is likely that they had no contact with the Saudi 'Wahhabis'. Vast numbers of Bengali Muslim peasants, heavily indebted to and oppressed by 'upper' caste Hindu landlords and moneylenders, readily joined these movements, inspired not just by their particular religious appeal but also because they represented a revolt against the oppressive 'upper' caste Hindu-dominated system that they laboured under. In other parts of India, numerous 'low' caste Muslims joined similar movements, inspired also by the access to the resources of the Islamic scripturalist tradition which they afforded them, hitherto largely a preserve of 'upper' caste or so-called ashraf Mulims, thus acting as a form of upward social mobility. In a sense this also represented a form of social protest against the entrenched ashraf and their culture, some of which was seen by puritans as decadent and un-Islamic. At the same time it allowed the upwardly mobile 'low' caste groups joining these movements to appropriate aspects of ashraf culture that were inextricably linked to the forms in which Islam was expressed by the reformists—for instance, the stress on Persian, Arabic and Urdu—facilitating a process that sociologists have termed as 'Ashrafisation'.


The reformist or, if you like, puritanical Islamic movements that began emerging from the early nineteenth century or so represented a range of political stances. Some of them were clearly anti-colonial, such as those in the Pukhtun areas. The British colonial authorities readily branded many such anti-colonial Islamic movements as 'Wahhabi' only to justify their brutal suppression and to win the support of Muslims who were opposed to the version of Islam that these movements represented. Some other such reformists, who shared what is very loosely termed as a 'Wahhabi' orientation towards local cultures, were pro-British, the most notable of these being Sir Sayyed Ahmad Khan, the founder of the Aligarh movement. Those who were branded by their critics as 'Wahhabis' did not form a single identifiable group. Often there was little or no communication between them. This explains the fact of the diverse political stances that they represented. Interestingly, not all of them had heard of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, and not all those who had actually supported him.

A major event in the direction of bringing together some like-minded scholars and activists who openly supported the Saudi 'Wahhabis' and the Saudi state, then heavily criticized by many Indian Muslims for its attacks on the holy shrines of the Hijaz and its compact with Britian against the Ottomans Khilafat, was the formation of the All-India Jamiat e Ahl-e Hadith in 1906, thus giving these individuals a corporate identity. Over the years, the Jamiat established its own network of madrasas, mosques as well as publishing houses. The Jamiat, the apex body of the Ahl-e Hadith, reveled in controversy, attacking the Hanafi Sunnis, besides other Muslim groups, for allegedly straying from the path of Islam. Yet, the Jamiat did not represent a single political stance, and right up till the Partition of India in 1947 AH leaders were divided among themselves, some supporting the Muslim League, others supporting the Congress, and yet others supporting the British.

The AH remained, as it still does, a small minority among the Indian Muslims. Yet, from the mid-1970s, it saw a major boost in terms of infrastructural development and propaganda networks. This owed, in large measure, to liberal funding by Saudi and other Gulf sources, keen to export their conservative, literalist, pro-Saudi monarchical version of Islam across the world. As a result, AH madrasas sprang up even in some areas with a very small Ahl-e Hadith population; a large number of Saudi funded publishing houses were founded in India that specialized in producing literature attacking the Hanafis and Shias and translating works by Saudi 'Wahhabi' writers; graduates of AH madrasas in India began receiving scholarships to study in Saudi universities—some of them stayed behind in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf
states, working in various government and private organizations, others returned to India to set up madrasas with Saudi support or teach in established madrasas, their salaries often being paid for by Saudi sources; some Muslim magazines (and not all of them AH) began receiving funds from Saudi sources in order to promote support for the Saudi monarchy, heavily criticised for its un-Islamic ways and its close alliance with the United States.

Due to this Saudi connection, the significant differences that had distinguished many Indian AH pioneers from the Saudi 'Wahhabis' (such as their opposition to taqlid, as opposed to the Saudi Wahhabi taqlid of the Hanbali school, the fact that some of these pioneers were also associated with some or the other form of Sufism, etc.) were sought to be done away with. Saudi finance meant that efforts had to be made to emulate as closely as possible the Saudi 'Wahhabi' form of Islam. In political terms, it also meant propaganda on behalf of the Saudi ruling family, for Saudi Arabia's close alliance with the United States and against the Iranian Revolution, which was branded as Shia, 'heretical' and, therefore, 'un-Islamic' in AH propaganda.

In post-Partition India, in contrast to its Pakistani counterparts, it is important to note, the Indian AH have not engaged in any sort of explicit political activism, and hence the spectre that some media persons draw of a so-called Indian 'Wahhabi' conspiracy is far-fetched. Like other Indian Muslim groups, the Indian Ahl-e Hadith have routinely denounced terrorism and have stressed the need for harmonious relations between Hindus and Muslims. The only exception to this is the Pakistan-sponsored Lashkar-e Tayyeba, which is related to one faction of the Pakistani AH and is active in Kashmir. Numerous Indian AH leaders have gone on record to condemn the killings of innocent people in Kashmir, whether by the Indian Army or by self-styled Islamist militants such as the Lashkar. Some AH leaders I have met in Kashmir have also expressed their opposition to the Lashkar's tactics, arguing that these are indeed 'un-Islamic', although they cannot openly condemn the group for fear of their lives. This shows that despite their roots in a common sectarian milieu, different groups that claim the Ahl-e Hadith label do not have a common political agenda or orientation. Notably, in Kerala, the Kerala Nadwat ul-Mujahidin, the local counterpart of the north Indian AH, is very actively engaged in inter-faith dialogue. One of its branches actively works with Hindus in critiquing communalism and extremism, both Hindu and Muslim, and is also close to the Communist Party.

In recent years, a number of bomb blasts have occurred in different parts of India, which the Indian media have quickly attributed to a 'Wahhabi' conspiracy, generally without any proof at all. The most recent such case was a blast at the most popular Sufi shrine in all of South Asia, the dargah of Hazrat Moinuddin Chishti in Ajmer. The Indian media and intelligence sources claimed a radical anti-Sufi 'Wahhabi' hand in this, although they failed to offer any evidence. Who is behind this and other such blasts in the recent past is still unclear and could be any one's guess.


Hence, the tendency to automatically blame a so-called radical Muslim hand behind these must be guarded against. Theories doing the rounds attribute the Ajmer blast, as well as several other such blasts, to various sources, including Hindu chauvinist groups, the state authorities themselves, the CIA and the Mossad and sundry 'Wahhabi' groups based in Pakistan and/or Bangladesh. Prudence demands that the media and state authorities desist from jumping onto the American bandwagon of the so-called 'war on terror' by quickly attributing every such incident to a 'Muslim extremist' or so-called 'Wahhabi' hand.

As I have sought to argue, the simplistic notion that equates 'Wahhabism' with 'terrorism' is flawed. As the case of the Indian 'Wahhabis' clearly shows, the political response of any religious movement does not flow only from its theology but, equally, if not more, importantly, reflects the particular social and political context in which it finds itself, which can, of course, change over time. By and large, and despite the grave challenges that the Indian Muslims, the AH in general included, have faced, their response has been to steer away from counter-violence, recognising this as counter-productive, and insisting on the need for better relations between Hindus and Muslims. A few fringe extremist groups do exist, but then extremism is not a Muslim monopoly, and in India, where Muslims are a minority, the challenge from Hindu extremism is much more threatening. Indeed, a purusal of AH literature reveals that its diatribes are almost exclusivly focussed on other Muslim groups, seeking to rebut them as 'un-Islamic', while generally ignoring the Hindus or other communities living in India. Intra-Muslim, rather than Hindu-Muslim, differences and conflicts are of more concern to the AH. However, even this should not be exaggerated, as these conflicts, although fanned by AH ulema, have had only a limited impact on relations between 'lay' Muslims belonging to different Muslim groups, and has rarely taken the form of actual phyical violence.

India's future and prosperity critically depends on better relations between the different religious communities that have lived here together for centuries. This calls for the promotion of new understandings of each religion that can help promote genuine inter-faith dialogue and which at the same time critique theological formulations that promote inter-sectarian and inter-community strife and hatred. In this regard, it is obvious that the AH and similar Muslim groups, like their counterparts among the Hindus, would need to engage in considerable
soul-searching.
=========================
This paper was presented by the author at a conference on Indo-Iranian Relations, recently organised at the Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran.

All this to be taken with a grain of piquant salt!!!

Key to poverty alleviation is to give people a stake with assets!

Here is a fascinating overview of comparing rich Black Americans versus poor Black Americans, and this chap seems to point to having land as assets in the family as one good factor towards the upliftment of people from poverty! And this debate, during this time of sub-prime crisis, is to make sure that there is good financial instructure available for people to purchase their own homes!

Also look at Hernando de Soto's work. Very very interesting and controversial indeed.

Read and reflect!

Forty Acres and a Gap in Wealth
By HENRY LOUIS GATES Jr.
Cambridge, Mass.

LAST week, the Pew Research Center published the astonishing finding that 37 percent of African-Americans polled felt that “blacks today can no longer be thought of as a single race” because of a widening class divide. From Frederick Douglass to the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., perhaps the most fundamental assumption in the history of the black community has been that Americans of African descent, the descendants of the slaves, either because of shared culture or shared oppression, constitute “a mighty race,” as Marcus Garvey often put it.

“By a ratio of 2 to 1,” the report says, “blacks say that the values of poor and middle-class blacks have grown more dissimilar over the past decade. In contrast, most blacks say that the values of blacks and whites have grown more alike.”

The message here is that it is time to examine the differences between black families on either side of the divide for clues about how to address an increasingly entrenched inequality. We can’t afford to wait any longer to address the causes of persistent poverty among most black families.

This class divide was predicted long ago, and nobody wanted to listen. At a conference marking the 40th anniversary of Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s infamous report on the problems of the black family, I asked the conservative scholar James Q. Wilson and the liberal scholar William Julius Wilson if ours was the generation presiding over an irreversible, self-perpetuating class divide within the African-American community.

“I have to believe that this is not the case,” the liberal Wilson responded with willed optimism. “Why go on with this work otherwise?” The conservative Wilson nodded. Yet, no one could imagine how to close the gap.

In 1965, when Moynihan published his report, suggesting that the out-of-wedlock birthrate and the number of families headed by single mothers, both about 24 percent, pointed to dissolution of the social fabric of the black community, black scholars and liberals dismissed it. They attacked its author as a right-wing bigot. Now we’d give just about anything to have those statistics back. Today, 69 percent of black babies are born out of wedlock, while 45 percent of black households with children are headed by women.

How did this happen? As many theories flourish as pundits — from slavery and segregation to the decline of factory jobs, crack cocaine, draconian drug laws and outsourcing. But nobody knows for sure.

I have been studying the family trees of 20 successful African-Americans, people in fields ranging from entertainment and sports (Oprah Winfrey, the track star Jackie Joyner-Kersee) to space travel and medicine (the astronaut Mae Jemison and Ben Carson, a pediatric neurosurgeon). And I’ve seen an astonishing pattern: 15 of the 20 descend from at least one line of former slaves who managed to obtain property by 1920 — a time when only 25 percent of all African-American families owned property.

Ten years after slavery ended, Constantine Winfrey, Oprah’s great-grandfather, bartered eight bales of cleaned cotton (4,000 pounds) that he picked on his own time for 80 acres of prime bottomland in Mississippi. (He also learned to read and write while picking all that cotton.)

Sometimes the government helped: Whoopi Goldberg’s great-great-grandparents received their land through the Southern Homestead Act. “So my family got its 40 acres and a mule,” she exclaimed when I showed her the deed, referring to the rumor that freed slaves would receive land that had been owned by their masters.

Well, perhaps not the mule, but 104 acres in Florida. If there is a meaningful correlation between the success of accomplished African-Americans today and their ancestors’ property ownership, we can only imagine how different black-white relations would be had “40 acres and a mule” really been official government policy in the Reconstruction South.

The historical basis for the gap between the black middle class and underclass shows that ending discrimination, by itself, would not eradicate black poverty and dysfunction. We also need intervention to promulgate a middle-class ethic of success among the poor, while expanding opportunities for economic betterment.

Perhaps Margaret Thatcher, of all people, suggested a program that might help. In the 1980s, she turned 1.5 million residents of public housing projects in Britain into homeowners. It was certainly the most liberal thing Mrs. Thatcher did, and perhaps progressives should borrow a leaf from her playbook.

The telltale fact is that the biggest gap in black prosperity isn’t in income, but in wealth. According to a study by the economist Edward N. Wolff, the median net worth of non-Hispanic black households in 2004 was only $11,800 — less than 10 percent that of non-Hispanic white households, $118,300. Perhaps a bold and innovative approach to the problem of black poverty — one floated during the Civil War but never fully put into practice — would be to look at ways to turn tenants into homeowners. Sadly, in the wake of the subprime mortgage debacle, an enormous number of houses are being repossessed. But for the black poor, real progress may come only once they have an ownership stake in American society.

People who own property feel a sense of ownership in their future and their society. They study, save, work, strive and vote. And people trapped in a culture of tenancy do not.

The sad truth is that the civil rights movement cannot be reborn until we identify the causes of black suffering, some of them self-inflicted. Why can’t black leaders organize rallies around responsible sexuality, birth within marriage, parents reading to their children and students staying in school and doing homework? Imagine Al Sharpton and Jesse Jackson distributing free copies of Virginia Hamilton’s collection of folktales “The People Could Fly” or Dr. Seuss, and demanding that black parents sign pledges to read to their children. What would it take to make inner-city schools havens of learning?

John Kenneth Galbraith once told me that the first step in reversing the economic inequalities that blacks face is greater voter participation, and I think he was right. Politicians will not put forth programs aimed at the problems of poor blacks while their turnout remains so low.

If the correlation between land ownership and success of African-Americans argues that the chasm between classes in the black community is partly the result of social forces set in motion by the dismal failure of 40 acres and a mule, then we must act decisively. If we do not, ours will be remembered as the generation that presided over a permanent class divide, a slow but inevitable process that began with the failure to give property to the people who had once been defined as property.

Henry Louis Gates Jr., a professor at Harvard, is the author of the forthcoming “In Search of Our Roots.”

All this to be taken with a grain of piquant salt!!!

The White Elephant Salesman says that White Elephants are good!

The British MP's committee rightfully castigated the UK Government and the EC for wanting to find this white elephant of a public sector behemoth. But never under-estimate the power of the public sector to suck on the tit of the taxpayer. Read this full column in the FT and try to figure out 2 things (1) what's the tangible cost benefit analysis to my tax pounds investment and (2) why did the private sector not invest the money that you have to come to me? No answers!

When will these chaps stop this habit of hitting the taxpayer for elitist projects?

I suppose the writers are totally disinterested observers in this Galileo project?

Read and Weep!

Why the Galileo project must go ahead
By Pierre Bartholomé and Kevin Madders

Published: November 18 2007 17:55 Last updated: November 18 2007 17:55

Galileo, Europe’s answer to the US global positioning system, is in trouble. Finance ministers are squabbling over a €2.4bn ($3.52bn) funding gap after a private consortium pulled out. A committee of British MPs has called for it to be put on ice unless there is a more convincing cost-benefit analysis.

The system was supposed to be available from 2010. Its accuracy would be measured in centimetres, not metres as with GPS, and visibility would improve – making it perfect for aircraft and other purposes, adding up to a huge civilian market. But GPS III, due in 2012, will also be more precise and reliable. So, if Galileo comes on line only around 2013, as present estimates suggest, it will not be able to steal a march on GPS.

Given the strength of the case against, it is hardly surprising to find ministers tongue-tied when defending Galileo. However, we believe Europe should go ahead with Galileo – but only under certain conditions.

Galileo is a technological place-marker. Have it, and you will be a leader in understanding and exploiting the potential of one of the biggest technologies to have arisen in the past 50 years. Shun it, and you will end up less well equipped to reap the benefits of positioning from space.

It is true that investing only in applications, not the system itself, could produce some of the benefits. But not all. There is no substitute for knowing a fundamental tool such as this one inside out, for the simple reason that we do not know many of the applications yet. The best way to make the innovative jump comes from making and then running the system.

There is no doubt Galileo can fulfil this role. It is superbly designed. We do not think it necessary for Galileo to be better than GPS III. It needs to be equivalent, so that Europe is in the game. If it stays out now, it will be much harder ever to get in, because this is technology that evolves rapidly.

There is also the chance that the additional services – for example, early warning of failure for safety-critical users such as airlines – will pay handsomely. The market is there. But this is not really the point when one enters a world game such as this. Contrary to what the UK House of Commons transport committee’s report suggests, not much trust can ultimately be placed in mere cost-benefit analysis with fundamental ­enabling infrastructures of this kind. Such analysis tends to be too crude because hard data are necessarily unavailable.

It was for the same reason that the UK could not see the value of communications satellites for Europe in the 1970s, which in fact turned into a ­powerful market for applications such as television and the internet.

Spatial positioning technology is in the same league as previous fundamental technologies, such as transistors, computers and mobile phones. We must get on with making sure the chances can be seized.

However, there are many ways ­Galileo can come unstuck, especially managerial and political. It is essential that delays are minimised. The system’s design should not be tampered with to play catch-up with GPS, for example, or downgraded as suggested by the transport committee report.

The European Commission must assume clear ownership and top-level management responsibility, and equip itself to exercise the role of supremo effectively. All those involved will have to allow it to meet its targets, working with and directing the European Space Agency as prime contractor.

European Union member states must resist the temptation to interfere in the project once it kicks off anew. On the Commission’s side, it needs to be more pragmatic about allocating work between countries. The normal rigours of open competitive bidding will ­probably have to be relaxed for this case. The Commission should aim for a compromise.

Policymakers need to stop duping themselves and others: it is idle to assume commercial revenue will cover all operations costs. The EU must plan for a sustaining budget. However, it should also look at the merits of slicing up and auctioning individual Galileo commercial services as the market ­ripens. The EU should guarantee far better transparency.

If ministers endorse a Galileo reorientated on these kinds of premises, it can turn the system into an asset for the citizens and security of Europe.


Mr Bartholomé, former head of the European Space Agency’s satellite communications design team, and Mr ­Madders are partners in the consultancy, Systemics Network International. Tony Ballard of Harbottle & Lewis also contributed to this article


All this to be taken with a grain of piquant salt!!!

The sun is rising in the west, the French protesting against the Unions???

I nearly fell off the planet when I read this. Sarko's fight against the unions is something that is good and I have mentioned this before. But when i read in the FT that French commuters are actually demostrating against the Unions, I felt good. This battle has to be fought if France can fight the 21st century economic war. I quote:

Frustrated commuters staged demonstrations in Paris yesterday to protest at the continuing transport strike as rail unions voted to extend their industrial action for another 24 hours.
Waving placards calling for an end to "the dictatorship of unions", a crowd of between 3,000 and 10,000 people braved freezing temperatures to denounce the spread of strikes that blocked public transport for five days.


And the fact that his popularity is dipping is ok, reality is always different from the promise. But he has a mandate from the French people, go Sarko go!

All this to be taken with a grain of piquant salt!!!

Commonwealth threatens Pakistan and Pakistan yawns!

So Pakistan faces being suspended from the Commonwealth. Oh! my word. And what is that supposed to do? make the generals quake in their boots? You will withdraw British Council Library funding? Or not invite General Musharraf to the Commonwealth Heads of State Meeting?

Gosh, I am sure that makes him so worried. Silly gestures like this dont help anybody and makes the person making these gestures look utterly foolish and inconsequential. See the OIC and Arab League? Would you really listen to their inane foaming declarations? No, nobody does. Both bodies are a joke and full of hot air slogans.

The Commonwealth Commission should stop doing this rot and stick to cultural, educational, social and economic development. It does not have the clout to deal with politics (even the UN doesnt, how on earth does the Queen think that she will be able to twist Pakistan's arm?). Remember what happened last time Pakistan got suspended? The Commonwealth went crawling back to it. Supine!



All this to be taken with a grain of piquant salt!!!

See why job creation is good, you idiots?

I have spoken before about the pathetic tendency of Indian politicians to interfere with job creation. One comment that I got was that it will remove agricultural jobs and livelihood and and. You really cannot run a tiny farm (see my email response on an email list)

If you remove subsidies in India, one has to be prepared for a rash of suicides, like what we have been seeing for the past many years. Plus in a democracy, consumers do not have voting weight to the extent farmers do. For example, while an onion crisis might blow a government out of water, ending subsidies in India is more politically painful. So while subsidies in India hurt more people than they are saving, it is politically impossible to remove them.

Also, small farmers are simply working on uneconomical farms. They have to get more efficient. Think about it in this way, if you have 1 acre of land and you rotate your crops say an amazing twice an year, in say UP. You will not be able to raise sufficient revenue to sustain a family of 4. I remember a paper somewhere which had said that the minimum acerage is about 11 acres to provide bottom quartile income levels in India. What’s the average small farm size? 2.3 acres (or thereabouts!).

We subsidise water, electricity, seeds, and and and. Our rural infrastructure is full of holes (pun intended!). Indian farming is and will go through some severe wrenching changes and we will face much angst. The only way to protect the small farmers is to form bigger and better cooperatives, but that will mean loosing the dead hand of the state which stops people from forming these cooperatives. And many more bits."


But see this WSJ Article. This is, of course, making the various people who are parasites on the poor all upset. Dont you see? if the poor start coming out of poverty, then all the assorted NGO's, Politicians and the activists will be out of a job!, no wonder good news like this is not propagated further.


> Moving Up in Mumbai
> Humble Jobs at the Mall Are Lifting
> Legions of Indians Out of Poverty
> By ERIC BELLMAN
> November 17, 2007; Page A1
>
> Mumbai, India
>
> As an elevator operator in a dingy apartment building, Mohamed Shaikh
> used to ponder ways to get himself out of his mind-numbing job and his
> family out of the slums. Vishal Bhatade once worked 12 hours a day
> cutting cloth in a garment factory for less than $50 a month. Rakesh
> Gundeti used to worry his family wouldn't make it after his father was
> laid off and his mother developed cancer.
>
> On a muggy Mumbai morning recently, the three young men left their
> cramped homes in slums around the city and headed to their work stations
> on the top floor of a mall housed in a former textile mill. There, in
> the men's denim section of a Pantaloon department store, they joined an
> economic drama sweeping across India.
>
> For nine hours a day, six days a week, they folded jeans, stocked
> shelves and explained the different styles of pants to their
> middle-class customers. Their wage: roughly $1,600 a year, with the
> prospect of regular raises and promotions -- much more than any of their
> parents earned and double the annual average salary in India.
> [See more]
> Eric Bellman
> Mohamed Shaikh grew up in the slums in the shadow of the Phoenix Mills,
> the mall where he works today.
>
> At Pantaloon, they were brushing up against a lifestyle they hope to be
> fully part of some day.
>
> Equipped with new cellphones, the three men took to speaking to one
> other in English, a language they rarely used before. They also absorbed
> the latest Bollywood fashion trends, buying knock-off designer jeans
> from street markets rather than paying Pantaloon's prices of $20 to $70
> a pair. On weekends after work, they would hang outside dance clubs,
> anxious to see the clubbers' outfits. "I will spend money like them
> someday," said Mr. Bhatade.
>
> Such basic sales jobs, unremarkable and often derided in the West, are
> providing careers, confidence, and a shot at entering the consumer class
> to millions of impoverished young men and women across India. As their
> ranks swell, these children of slum dwellers, servants, sweepers and
> others low on the socioeconomic totem pole are forming a new stratum of
> workers. They are likely to play an important role in determining the
> future of the world's second-most-populous nation.
>
> Until recently, much of the new wealth in India went to college-educated
> computer programmers, consultants and call-center workers. While they
> have made the country's technology industry a new pillar of global
> commerce, the total number employed by the software industry is still
> only about two million -- less than 0.2% of India's 1.1 billion
> population. At the other end of the spectrum, India still has more than
> 200 million people who live below the poverty line, mostly farmers.
>
> Between the two are tens of millions of Indians, mostly city dwellers in
> their 20s and 30s, who are taking their first steps into the salaried
> class by selling goods and services to the increasingly free-spending
> upper crust. They represent a kind of swing vote in how far India can
> spread the fruits of its rapid expansion. Annual economic growth has
> averaged more than 8.5% for the past four years, but much of the
> benefits have accrued to the old industrial families and the tech-savvy
few.
>
> In the past, less-educated urbanites had few options beyond seeking a
> government job (often through family connections or bribes). They would
> go abroad or work for wealthy families who refer to them as "delivery
> boys," "tea boys" and "peons."
>
> In contrast to China, where wealth spread as rural labor moved from
> farming to manufacturing, India's growth is being led by a sharp rise in
> domestic consumption. Stronger spending power is opening up
> opportunities concentrated in service sectors like retailing, banking
> and hospitality and telecommunications.
>
> Firm data are hard to come by, but available statistics and anecdotal
> evidence suggest an explosion in service jobs. The unemployment rate for
> male high-school graduates in the cities, for example, fell from 8.5% in
> 1994 to 5.1% in 2005, according to government statistics. Over the next
> three years, says the Images Group, a research and consulting group in
> India, the retail sector will create more than 2.5 million new jobs in
> the country. India's Reliance Industries Ltd. says it will hire close to
> 500,000 people to staff its new chain of supermarkets. Pantaloon Retail
> Ltd., India's largest retailer with annual sales of around $1 billion,
> hires more than 500 people a month.
> [Retail]
> Rakesh Gundeti (right) helps a young customer as a colleague looks on.
>
> "People are not despondent anymore," says N.S. Sastry, former director
> of the National Sample Survey Organization, the government office that
> tracks employment trends. "They see better employment opportunities,
> better earning capacities and opportunities to improve their skills."
>
> In the brightly lit, white-walled Pantaloon jeans department, the
> seven-foot-high shelves are filled with denim from international brands
> like Lee and Pepe. It could be any middling U.S. department store,
> except for the Hindi pop-music videos playing on huge television screens
> and the photos of Bollywood stars promoting the brands.
>
> Still, it was a completely foreign environment when the three young men
> first arrived several years ago. "They are absolutely raw when they come
> in," says Mansur Khan, the 32-year-old who trained all the department's
> employees after working for Pantaloon for seven years. He teaches new
> recruits about confidence, sales, fashion and even hygiene. "They come
> from an altogether different background."
>
> Mr. Shaikh, a lanky 25-year-old with wiry hair, grew up in the slums
> nearby. His father died when he was ten, forcing his mother to work
> different jobs to raise her two sons. After sending them off to school
> in the morning, she made plastic buckets and cut thread for shirts in
> small neighborhood factories. She didn't always make enough to feed her
> children. The only open space for the boys to play was a nearby
> graveyard. They stumbled over tombstones during games of cricket.
>
> Along with his mother and brother, Mr. Shaikh today shares a
> 100-square-foot home on a dark alley in a Muslim ghetto. It has a bed, a
> tiny kitchen and a pile of suitcases for the moves his family makes
> almost every year.
>
> After high school, Mr. Shaikh had put aside his interest in college to
> find a job. "Once you start looking for money, you stop thinking about
> education."
>
> He worked for a while in a small doctor's clinic, handing out
> prescriptions. The elevator operator's job, he recalls, was the worst.
> So four years ago, when Phoenix Mills opened -- part of a massive urban
> development project -- he applied at Pantaloon without even knowing what
> it was.
>
> Mr. Gundeti's family is from the southern state of Andhra Pradesh. But
> he grew up in Mumbai, where his father worked in a textile factory until
> his job was eliminated. Almost all of the $10,000 severance he received
> went toward treating his wife's stomach cancer. The family also sold its
> slum home to help pay for the treatment. Still, Mrs. Gundeti died last
> August.
>
> The elder Mr. Gundeti now sweeps floors at a nearby television studio.
> He had great hopes for Rakesh, whom he named after the first Indian in
> space, Rakesh Sharma, who was part of a Soviet mission in 1984. But he's
> turned cautious about what he expects from life. "Every time we have a
> little hope, something bad happens," the father said as he brushed aside
> ants on the floor of his small corrugated-steel home.
> [Vishal Bhatade (center) and Rakesh Gundeti (right)]
> Vishal Bhatade (center) and Rakesh Gundeti (right) are climbing the
> economic ladder in Mumbai, buoyed by jobs they held at the Pantaloon
> department store.
>
> Rakesh, 22 years old and a big fan of American pro wrestling, had a
> friend who worked at Pantaloon. So he applied, too.
>
> Mr. Bhatade grew up in a small town about 60 miles north of Mumbai. For
> the past 15 years, his father has manned a machine that makes brown
> paper bags. The family lives in a 150-square-foot hut built against the
> wall of the factory. When Mr. Bhatade was a boy, he planted marigolds
> and a pomegranate tree outside their door and adopted neighborhood
> street cats to make the modest abode feel like a home. His parents
> insisted on a basic education.
>
> "We didn't want them to suffer like we did," says his mother, Vanita
> Bhatade, 46 years old.
>
> His first job after high school was at a garment factory, where he
> worked for more than a year. Mr. Bhatade's father told him to look for
> work in Mumbai, so he moved in with his uncle in a city slum. After a
> stint peddling credit cards door to door, a friend tipped him off that
> Pantaloon was hiring. He went for an interview in May of 2004 and got
> the job.
>
> Immediately, Mr. Bhatade found the clientele to be a big challenge. It
> was the first time any of the young men had talked to people much richer
> than themselves. "When I came, I was very shy," Mr. Bhatade recalls. "I
> would watch them from afar. I couldn't even ask them what they were
> looking for."
>
> The young men were often yelled at or accused of falling down on the
> job, as skeptical customers refused to believe their size was out of
> stock or got irate if the clothes they wanted didn't fit.
>
> They'd shout, "'Who is handling this section?'" Mr. Bhatade recalls.
> "Who is the boss? Who is the store manager? Who is the department
> manager?" Mr. Bhatade would offer a simple "I am sorry."
>
> As the longest-serving Pantaloon employee of the three, Mr. Shaikh
> became the unofficial assistant manager of the department, often staying
> late into the night to make sure his shelves and racks looked clean. "I
> never used to fold my clothes at home," he said with a grin.
>
> For jeans advice, he turned to Mr. Bhatade, the department's resident
> expert on more than 50 types of jeans and denim. He can describe the
> difference between "monkey wash" and "tiger wash" to his
> English-speaking customers. (In monkey wash, the front of the pants is
> faded. In tiger wash, the fading is in horizontal stripes.)
> [Rakesh Gundeti, 23 and his family]
> Martin von Krogh/WpN
> Rakesh Gundeti, 23, rear, lives with his stepmother, in yellow, and his
> father. The house gets crowded when his sister and her husband, center,
> are visiting.
>
> And for light relief to break up the day, they'd pick on Mr. Gundeti,
> the department comic, making fun of his "funny" southern Indian accent.
> When he'd return late from a tea break or ask to go home early, his
> colleagues insisted that he must have had a date. The razzing often sent
> Mr. Gundeti into a faux fit of anger, making everyone laugh.
>
> When not with customers, the three men would chat constantly about sales
> targets, cricket, family and movies. The managers discouraged them from
> bunching together on the floor, so they tried to stay at least five feet
> from each other as they folded pair after pair of jeans. One recent
> afternoon, Mr. Bhatade and Mr. Shaikh debated how their section compared
> to others in the store.
>
> Formal men's wear has the highest sales every month, so employees there
> have a greater shot at sales-based bonuses. But denim is better than
> working in the women's wear departments, they agreed, because female
> customers are much more demanding. "They will try on each color in their
> size and still they are never happy," said Mr. Shaikh, laughing. "Is
> your girlfriend like that?" he asked Mr. Bhatade. Blushing, Mr. Bhatade
> walked away.
>
> Their outside interests and social lives increasingly tilted toward
> Pantaloon and away from the slums. "I try to teach my friends to end
> their vulgar language and behavior," said Mr. Gundeti of his
> neighborhood friends. "They don't change, so I don't spend time with
> some of them anymore."
>
> Instead, the men watch movies together or with other acquaintances from
> Pantaloon. Restaurant dinners are still beyond their reach, but on
> birthdays they pitch in for a cake and take it to the beach to eat. On a
> company team-building outing, they slid down water slides at a resort
> near Mumbai. It was the first time Mr. Bhatade had been in a swimming
> pool. "Most of my free time I spend with my Pantaloon friends," he said.
>
> The store doubled as a place of worship. For a few weeks in September, a
> room near the denim department housed a statue of the elephant-headed
> Hindu god Ganesha that was decorated with streamers and flowers and lit
> with a purple spotlight. Mr. Gundeti went daily to give offerings and
> sing religious songs. Mr. Bhatade and 30 other Pantaloon employees later
> carried the idol to the ocean and left it in the Arabian Sea, the
> traditional end to the Ganesha festival.
> [chart]
>
> During Ramadan, the Muslim holy month, Mr. Shaikh and his supervisor,
> Mr. Khan, joined the store's other Muslim employees on the roof of the
> store to break their fast at dusk rather than going to nearby mosques.
> Each night, they kneeled among piles of boxes full of clothes to pray
> and passed dates and slices of watermelon as the sun set over the new
> mall being built next door.
>
> While Pantaloon isn't a quick route out of the slums, the jobs, and the
> pay, offered something else: the occasional luxury, some financial
> reassurance and a large dose of self-esteem.
>
> Mr. Shaikh used to wear irregular pieces from the factory where his
> mother worked -- shirts where the pockets didn't match, for example. His
> store job allowed him to purchase his first "branded" pair of jeans, on
> sale for $20. In September, he bought a computer, picking one that can
> also be used as a television so his mother can watch soap operas. Some
> regular customers started asking him for his fashion advice. "People are
> going for the comfort fit, not the boot cut," he said.
>
> Mr. Gundeti has supported his father with his Pantaloon salary and taken
> advantage of its afternoon shifts to study computer programming in the
> mornings. He just bought a laptop. It cost more than a desk top but his
> home has no desk. His family has noticed that he isn't as hot-tempered
> as he used to be and that he is more "gentlemanly." His Hindi is now
> peppered with English phrases like "you know," and "I mean." Over the
> next six years, he hopes to boost his salary significantly -- enough to
> buy an apartment for his father.
>
> Mr. Bhatade, too, has matured since he started working at the store,
> according to his parents and sisters. While he used to be shy and
> withdrawn, he recently planned his sister's wedding -- a huge
> undertaking in even the poorest Indian homes. He says he is embarrassed
> by the clothes he used to wear and today tries to teach his friends and
> his sisters about Mumbai style. Meanwhile, he has become one of the most
> eligible bachelors in his community, says his father, who has turned
> down more than five offers of arranged marriage for his son already.
>
> Over the past month, each team member has taken new steps up in the
> direction of the consumer class. Mr. Gundeti earned a promotion to
> cashier in Pantaloon's jeans department. Mr. Shaikh left his job to
> start his own small business, recruiting people to work on construction
> projects across the Middle East.
>
> Mr. Bhatade was promoted to "team leader," which means he will manage a
> group similar to his old gang in the denim department, but on a
> different floor. It is now his turn to teach the job to a new batch of
> hires from the slums.


All this to be taken with a grain of piquant salt!!!

Too fat to work!!! Unbelieveable!

Too fat to work? this made my head spin. Read and weep!

Almost two thousand people who are too fat to work have been paid a total of £4.4 million in benefit, it emerged last night. Other payments went to fifty sufferers of acne and ten incapacitated by leprosy.

Frank Field, a former Social Security Minister, said last night that too many people were working the incapacity benefit system to avoid work. “It is a racket, which governments have allowed to exist for far too long. I do not blame people for working the system, it is the job of politicians to stop them doing it.”

The number on incapacity benefit has more than trebled since 1979 but in recent years it has been broadly stable at about 2.7 million. In the past 12 years, however, there has been a dramatic shift in the illnesses for which people are being given the benefit: 40 per cent now claim for mental health problems compared with just 20 per cent in 1995.

Mr Field said: “The big change over the last decade has been into illnesses which largely defy a clear medical classification: depression, dizziness and such. It is a move from the tangible illness to the intangible.”

The complete list of the 480 different illnesses and complaints for which people received incapacity benefit in February were released by the Department for Work and Pensions. More than £2 billion was paid in 2006-07 for mental health complaints, including £518 million to those with what are described as “unknown and unspecified” diseases.

Overall more than £1.1 billion was paid to people suffering from a depressive episode plus a further £276 million to the estimated 116,000 claimants with “other anxiety disorders” and £122 million to the estimated 50,000 suffering from a “reaction to severe stress”.
A total of 15,600 people received benefits for “malaise and fatigue” and a further 8,100 for “dizziness and giddiness”. The figures disclose that 4,000 claimants had headaches, 2,700 migraines and 1,890 suffered from eating disorders. About £100,000 in benefits went to those with acne and a similar amount to 60 people with “nail disorder”. Nausea and vomiting cost £2 million in benefits for 900 people.



All this to be taken with a grain of piquant salt!!!

Teething Troubles for MiFID!

See what I mean by ill thought out regulation? on the other hand, it could just be teething troubles and this will settle down soon. I suspect its 40:60, but the jury is out! MiFID seems to be causing some teething troubles as this report suggests: I would actually see the fragmentation as a reasonably good step as more fragmentation will break the hidebound European trading structures and shake up the sclerotic participants. This should help reduce costs and increase efficiency.

The markets in financial instruments directive might be only two weeks old but fund managers and brokers have complained fragmentation resulting from the European Commission directive is affecting their ability to trade European equities.

Mifid has been introduced to foster competition between trading and trade reporting venues but an immediate effect has been to complicate how they trade European stocks, institutions have argued.

London-based companies aired these concerns last week after the share prices of some UK blue chip stocks rose sharply despite slow trading on the London Stock Exchange.

It was only when they checked Boat, the trade reporting platform backed by a consortium of investment banks, that they saw heavy trading in those names being executed away from the LSE.

A handful of the largest investment banks are connected to all viable European trading venues and are just going live on the systems – smart order routers – that aggregate price information. Those brokers that have not connected to these platforms complain they are at a disadvantage compared with their larger rivals.

One broker said: “We are not connected to Boat and there has not been a lot of visibility into how Boat works.”

Boat argued it is open to all institutions, having increased its number of clients from 10, when the formation of the banking consortium was first reported by Financial News in August last year, to 25.

But other companies are embracing the opportunities presented by Mifid. UBS last week linked up to Chi-X, the trading system owned by Nomura’s agency broker Instinet, and the Irish Stock Exchange for the first time.

Nick Holtby, head of European client trading and execution at UBS Investment Bank, said the additional venues would increase the range of liquidity pools available.

The Swiss bank said last week it was advising its clients that it will “smart order route all client flow unless it has a specific instruction from the client not to do so”. The bank added: “The UBS smart order router will access viable pools of liquidity such as exchanges, multi-lateral trading facilities and dark pools and route flow accordingly.”

The use of trading systems, such as Chi-X, and dark pools of liquidity, which are anonymous matching systems administered by banks or brokers, is set to increase under Mifid.


All this to be taken with a grain of piquant salt!!!

Let the Anti Semite and Holocaust Denier speak at Oxford

I support the right of this anti semite and holocaust denier David Irwing as well as the far right wing party leader, Nick Griffin to speak at Oxford. Dont drive these thoughts underground. Freedom of speech is inviolate even if it means having wrong ideas about fondly held ideals.

Let them speak, let them come out into the open where we can debate and discuss them. Where their wrong ideas can be combated. But forbidding them to speak, not debating with them means that they have won!

And for crying out loud, this is a bloody university, where else will the students get their mind stretching? Its big brother, i tell you, liberalism and thought control gone mad!

All this to be taken with a grain of piquant salt!!!

Shame on the British Police for racially persecuting a british copper!

This is criminal. This is not what I think the British Bobby should be doing. To racially abuse a fellow policeman, to frame him etc. And then the Police Federation itself dropping support. Disgusting.

The thin blue line is what stops the society from descending into chaos. I still support the British Police, despite the de Menezes killing, the Stephen Lawrence murder and now this. But remember that faith and reputation are very easily lost. How on earth are you going to get support from minorities if this is how you treat them? How on earth are minorities going to integrate into society? or join the armed forces?

Some painful quotes.

He has always maintained that he was framed after he started to sue the force for racial discrimination following a series of incidents, culminating in a Ku Klux Klan poster being left on his desk.
The CPS subsequently decided that four officers should be charged with criminal offences over allegedly framing him. All were cleared in 2004, but one later admitted two offences arising from the case at a disciplinary hearing. Three have since left the force.
Alam was denied help by the Police Federation, which was found to have racially discriminated against him by an employment tribunal last year. The federation had refused to help him take legal action to clear his name.
The tribunal ruled there was overwhelming evidence that Alam was racially discriminated against and victimised. It also found that documents had been destroyed by a federation official in an attempt to thwart him.
Alam had twice sought help from the federation to clear his name by funding an appeal against his conviction after new evidence came to light. It refused, but had paid for the legal defence of the four officers who stood trial charged with framing him.



All this to be taken with a grain of piquant salt!!!