Spainish Elections and Terrorism, the links

Elections ARE influenced by terrorism. The death of Rajiv Gandhi and so many others in terrorist attacks have influenced the elections directly in India. The 9/11 terrorist attacks impacted the election of President Bush in his second term directly. The Bali Bombings impacted the elections in Indonesia and Australia. And perhaps the closest impact was the Madrid Bombings and the Spanish General Elections.

So what was the connection? How much was the impact? Did it change voter behaviour? By how much? Did it change voter turnout?

Now here's a paper on this

Valentina A. Bali, Terror and elections: Lessons from Spain, Electoral Studies, Volume 26,
Issue 3, September 2007, Pages 669-687.

Abstract: The present paper explores the ways a terrorist event can
influence electoral outcomes by examining the Madrid bombing terrorist attack
immediately before Spain's 2004 national elections. Uncharacteristically, rather
than "rally" public support towards the incumbent leadership this terrorist
incident contributed to the electoral upset. Based on individual level survey
data, the analyses suggest the terrorist attack mobilized citizens who are
traditionally less likely to participate in politics as well as center and
leftist voters, and encouraged some of these voters to switch to the opposition.
Quite critically, the incumbent government's unpopular foreign policies and
handling of the attacks had substantial and independent effects on their party's
defeat. Overall, this study highlights the key roles of timing of attacks and
priming of issues when understanding the effects of terrorism on
elections.

I further quote the introduction

The Spanish elections of 2004 were marked by two extraordinary yet possibly
related events: a large-scale terrorist attack shortly before the election and
an unexpected electoral upset for the incumbent party. On March 11th 2004, only
3 days before the national elections to the Spanish parliament were to take
place, Spain endured a large-scale terrorist attack at the hands of Islamic
militants, as later established. In the early morning, during the commuter rush,
several bombs exploded at three railway stations in Madrid resulting in almost
200 casualties and close to 2000 injured. Days later, the ruling Popular Party
(PP), led by José-Maria Aznar, lost in a surprising upset to the main opposition
Socialist Party (PSOE), led by José-Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, who then became the
new Prime Minister. Thereafter, pundits and academics alike were left to
determine whether the terrorist event had actually derailed in a matter of days
what some polls suggested was up to a 4% points advantage for the incumbent
government's party.

And the conclusion

There are several key lessons that the Madrid attacks can impart. First,
citizens' evaluations of the government's performance in the policy areas
related to the attack are clearly critical. If the citizenship generally
approves of the government's performance in those areas, a terrorist attack
close to an election may result in a rally of support or at least not hurt the
incumbent government. If, on the other hand, the government is vulnerable on
those policies, the attack may very well result in an anti-rally. According to
this logic, the incumbent parties in the Australian 2004 and British 2005
elections would have been quite challenged by a terrorist attack close to the
election, given the strong popular discontent with each government's foreign
policies at those times. On the other hand, a terrorist attack right before the
United States 2004 elections may have proved much less deleterious.

Another implication from the present research is the importance of the
timing of the terrorist act in relation to the elections. A terrorist attack,
distant from election times, should trigger, in principle, the mechanisms
associated with rally events. In such cases, an immediate focus on the
government's performance is not likely. In contrast, if the terrorist event
occurs close to election times, because of the political race and the media's
incentives, a speedy zeroing in on a discussion of the government's performance
becomes harder to avoid. Had the Madrid bombings occurred 3 months before the
elections, the time it took Spanish citizens to approximately return to “normal”
levels of concern with terrorism, the electoral outcomes may have been
different. Finally, the present research also highlights the importance of where
the terrorist event takes place. We might expect more forceful effects on
elections from one-shot terrorist attacks in societies with lower levels of
political participation and attachments.

I have to add that given this history, I would be very careful from a security perspective before any election as it is clearly possible to change the behaviour of the electorate via bombing! Secondly, a note to the political parties, do not be too far away from the general populace. Whether in Spain where the right got slated, or in Australia where the left got slated, be in touch with general opinion.

But will go back to my point, elections are a bigger way of changing your enemy's foreign policy, so if I was a terrorist, targeting the populace just before an election would be good!


All this to be taken with a grain of piquant salt!!!